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Abstract 
 
We construct a composite performance indicator to assess the relative 
performance of welfare policies in the EU countries. We show that the 
variability of performances cannot be explained only by the amount of 
resources devoted to social policies, but also by the composition of social 
expenditure: countries with higher shares of redistributive public expenditure 
obtain better results in the social sector. This result confirms the association 
between the type of welfare system, according to the traditional four-way 
classification, and the performance level. However, considering a more 
complete set of indicators of the structure of the welfare systems, we find that 
European countries cannot be grouped according to the traditional 
classification. Considering expenditure-side indicators and financing-side 
indicators together, three groups form: one comprising the UK and Iceland, one 
the Nordic countries and the Netherlands, one the continental (and southern) 
countries and Ireland. 
 
 
JEL classification codes: H11; H53; I3 
Keywords: welfare systems; European integration; cluster analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
Four welfare models are typically identified In the European Union (although 
they are less clearly demarcated than in the past): the Scandinavian model, 
which traditionally allocates a large amount of resources to predominantly 
universal welfare policies (around 32% of GDP in Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden), the continental model (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and 
Luxembourg) with an intermediate level of expenditure of 29% of GDP, the 
Anglo-Saxon model in Ireland and the United Kingdom with selective social 
policies and expenditure levels of just over a quarter of GDP and, finally, the 
Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal), which in the 
2000s allocated less than a quarter of GDP to welfare and which over the last 
few years have modified their welfare policies, allocating between 26 and 29% 
of GDP to the social sector in 2011. 
These different welfare systems have been extensively analysed in the socio-
economic literature from various perspectives that have highlighted the 
qualitative and quantitative differences between them (Titmus, 1974; Esping 
Andersen, 1990; Rhodes 1996; Goodin et al, 1999; Bertola et al, 2001; Arts 
and Gelissen (2002); Zoli 2004; Ferrera, 1996 and 2012, Ferrera et al, 2000; 
Hudson and Kuhner, 2012). 
This paper performs a comparative analysis of welfare systems in 19 European 
countries focussing on the outcomes of social policies. To this end, OECD and 
Eurostat data from 2011 (the last year for which it is possible to construct a 
complete dataset) are used in relation to eight areas of social expenditure 
(families, health, the elderly, unemployment, poverty, the labour market and 
redistribution). For each area of welfare, and on the basis of the policies that it 
includes, outcome indicators are identified as proxies for the objectives of the 
policies themselves. 
Following the methodology proposed by Tanzi and Schuknecht (2007), the 
paper constructs a composite performance indicator for the social sector of the 
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countries considered, which is then compared to net public social expenditure 
(i.e. net of fiscal interventions – tax levies and benefits –implemented by the 
various States). From the analysis, a certain variability emerges which is not 
linked to expenditure levels, which in turn exhibit less variability between 
countries in net terms. In contrast, the correlation between performance and 
social expenditure is more marked for subgroups of countries (for example for 
a number of countries belonging to the continental system – France, Belgium 
and Germany, which are joined by Ireland). The analysis suggests, first of all, 
the need for a policy of rationalisation of social expenditure, as opposed to a 
policy of expanding social expenditure in countries with a lower level of social 
expenditure (for example the Mediterranean countries). 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out a classification of 
European welfare systems based on the categories of decommodification, 
destratification and defamiliarisation proposed by Esping-Andersen (1990). 
Section 3 clarifies the welfare sectors considered in the analysis, while the 
whole of Section 4 is dedicated to setting out the outcome indicators adopted 
for each welfare area. Section 5 sets out the method used for calculating the 
performance index, before going on to introduce data concerning net social 
expenditure (Section 6) which are subsequently analysed in relation to the 
performance index (Section 7) and other characteristics of the welfare systems 
considered, comparing, by means of a cluster analysis, the results obtained with 
the traditional classification of welfare systems (Section 8). Section 9 
summarises the main results of the analysis.  
 
2. Welfare models in Europe 
In recent years, European countries have been characterised by a certain degree 
of convergence in their national social policies. This has occurred not just 
because of the demands of the economic crisis and an ageing population but 
also because of European guidelines in this context (Bouget, 2003). 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that a number of aspects which are peculiar to 
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specific national contexts have been the subject of reform1 and have therefore 
been aligned to a certain extent between the various countries, the general 
consensus is that four welfare models coexist in Europe, based on certain 
quantitative characteristics (i.e., the amount of resources dedicated to welfare) 
and qualitative characteristics (i.e., the kinds of measures implemented): the 
social-democratic model in the Nordic countries (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and the Netherlands), the corporative (or continental) model adopted 
by the continental European countries (Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg), the Anglo-Saxon model (Ireland and the UK) 
and the Mediterranean model (Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal). 
Inclusive, generous forms of coverage distinguish the social-democratic model. 
In this area, in fact, the established welfare system is folkhemment, the “shared 
house” of all citizens, who find in it robust protections throughout the whole 
cycle of life (Ferrera et al., 2012). The Nordic countries exhibit high levels of 
expenditure allocated to social protection, totalling around one third of GDP, 
and have recorded a gradual increase over time. In terms of the qualitative 
aspects identified by Esping-Andersen (1990), the social-democratic system is 
distinguished by a predominance of universalist schemes characterised by a 
high degree of decommodification, as benefits are provided irrespective of the 
individual’s occupational status and therefore his/her position in contractual 
market relations, a high degree of destratification, as equal treatment for all 
citizens means that social policies aim to reduce inequalities caused by 
occupational status or social class, and a high degree of defamiliarisation, that 
is, independence from family support (Esping-Andersen, 1999). 
Partially different distinctive features characterise the continental model, which 
was introduced in Germany at the end of the nineteenth century by Bismarck, 
which from the outset adopted a strongly insurance-based approach centred 
around the figure of the male breadwinner and led to the development of social 
protection against the risks of old age (with benefits being in proportion to 
                                                                    
1 Take, for example, pension reforms and national policies to extend provision of early 
childhood services which have been undertaken to reconcile work and family commitments 
recommended at the European level (Barcelona European Council, 2002). 
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pension contributions or remunerations) and mainly linked to citizens’ 
occupational status. Citizens who receive these benefits are thus identified on 
the basis of their occupational status and measures are specifically related to 
their different occupational statuses. This type of model is also characterised by 
a generally high level of social expenditure, between 25% and 30% of GDP, 
and exhibits and intermediate degree of decommodification, as the fact that 
benefits depend on individuals’ socio-economic status is only mitigated in 
certain cases (indeed, social policy measures depend largely on the 
beneficiary’s occupational status). As a result, the degree of destratification is 
intermediate (as the main objective of social policies is not to reduce 
inequality), and the degree of defamiliarisation is low as the role of family 
support remains crucial in providing assistance (Esping-Andersen, 1999). 
The Anglo-Saxon or liberal welfare model proposed by Beveridge in 1942 
characterises Ireland and the UK. The main aim is to prevent phenomena of 
extreme poverty. Access to benefits is selective and based on means testing. 
State social benefits target a narrow segment of the population (individuals at 
high risk of social exclusion). At the same time, a relatively high number of 
individuals who do not qualify for State benefits turn to the market to purchase 
private insurance (for example health insurance and private pensions). Thus, 
the Anglo-Saxon model exhibits a low degree of decommodification (as apart 
from a narrow segment of individuals at high risk of poverty, market 
dependence is high with regard to incomes). Destratification is low as the 
system consists in a de facto dual form of welfare: private for the rich and 
public for the poor. The degree of defamiliarisation is intermediate as the 
burden of family support is non-negligible for vulnerable social groups. 
The Mediterranean model is characterised by lower average levels of social 
expenditure (around a quarter of GDP) and a certain degree of fragmentariness 
among the mainly selective social expenditure programmes. A central role is 
assumed by the family and by parental assistance and there is a certain degree 
of differentiation between protection for employees in the public sector or of 
8 
 
E-PFRP N. 18 
2016 
 
large companies compared with other occupational categories. Following the 
classification proposed by Esping-Andersen (1999), the Mediterranean welfare 
system – a variant of the corporative model – is characterised by an 
intermediate level of decommodification and destratification, while the level of 
defamiliarisation is low. 
Finally, Europe’s recent eastward expansion hints at the possibility of 
identifying a fifth social model with lower levels of expenditure compared with 
the models mentioned above and with social policies which are still relatively 
heterogeneous in relation to each other as they are highly dependent of the 
peculiar characteristics of the socio-economic structure of the various 
countries. 
 
3. Performance of the social sector: data and outcome indicators 
The performance of the social sector is a concept marked by a certain 
complexity as it relates to both the efficiency and effectiveness of social 
policies, which are themselves dependent on a large number of factors and 
public policies which impact upon the various areas includes in welfare. In this 
paper, the performance of the social sector primarily refers to the degree to 
which the outcomes that policy-makers set out are achieved for the various 
sectors in which the measures are implemented. The multi-dimensional nature 
of the latter requires the construction of a synthetic indicator that takes into 
account the various categories of social expenditure. 
To this end, we use the OECD Social Expenditure and Eurostat database, 
considering the following eight sub-sectors of social expenditure that it 
includes: family, health, labour market, the elderly, the unemployed, the 
disabled, income support and social assistance. 
For the sake of clarity, it is possible to group the previous 8 sub-sectors into 
three main sectors which correspond to the three main objectives of welfare 
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policies: the maintenance of a certain standard of living (family policies, health 
policies, active employment policies), income support for vulnerable groups 
(the elderly, the unemployed and the disabled), and redistribution of resources 
to reduce inequality (reduction of poverty and concentration of income). 
The next step in our analysis was to identify outcome indicators for each of the 
eight sectors while taking account of the objectives towards which the welfare 
policies in each sector are oriented, distinguishing between monetary and in-
kind benefits (Fig. 1).2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                    
2 Readers are referred to Table A1 in the Appendix for details regarding individual expenditure 
items. 
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Fig. 1 Goals and Indicators of Welfare Policies 
 
 
11 
 
E-PFRP N. 18 
2016 
 
The indicators which directly or indirectly represent monetary variables (such 
as household income, coverage of unemployment benefits or pensions in 
percentage terms or the income based on which the Gini index is calculated) 
are expressed in net terms,3 i.e. net of fiscal measures (which take three forms: 
direct taxation of income resulting from social transfers, indirect taxation of 
consumption by recipients of transfers, and tax benefits for social welfare 
purposes) which national governments impose upon it. Following Adema et al. 
(1996, 1999, 2014) and in contrast to the prevailing literature, public 
expenditure allocated to social purposes is considered in net (and not gross) 
terms, thus representing the net – albeit aggregate – benefit that national social 
policies provide for beneficiaries. In this sense, it represents a more appropriate 
indicator of the intensity of public intervention in the social sector. 
We use data referring to 2011 (at the time of writing the last year for which a 
complete reference database can be constructed) for 19 European countries. 
Family policies are mainly oriented towards reconciling work and family life, 
and regard the provision of educational and care services for early childhood, 
parental leave and forms of home care for children or the elderly. The ultimate 
objective may therefore be identified as encouraging greater participation in the 
employment market on the part of women, who are often penalised by the 
burden of family responsibilities, in light of European recommendations in this 
regard.4 A further line of intervention, on the other hand, regards the granting 
of tax benefits (deductions, detractions or tax credits) or monetary transfers for 
families with children in order to support their income level and, ultimately, in 
order not to discourage births. 
As indicators for family welfare measures we have therefore used the maternal 
employment rate and, by means of a simulation analysis, calculated the net 
                                                                    
3 Where necessary, for the purposes of international comparison, monetary variables are 
expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms (US dollars). 
4 The recent Country Specific Recommendations (2013) contain recommendations for the 13 
Member States concerning the promotion of female employment in the labour market through 
the adoption of policies to reconcile work and family life and the removal of fiscal 
disincentives to female labour (Rossilli, 2014). 
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disposable income of a “typical” family – which we adopt as a benchmark – 
consisting of two children and two working parents with, respectively, a gross 
income from employment equal to 100% and 67% of the average income from 
employment in their country of residence.5 
According to the prevailing literature (Tanzi et al. 2000, 2003, 2006), life 
expectancy at birth would seem to be a good indicator of the performance of 
health policies. 
The third group of social policies geared towards ensuring the maintenance of a 
certain standard of living can be identified in what have been called “active 
labour market policies”, that is, all those initiatives (such as training, work-
related education, apprenticeships, careers guidance tools, etc.) designed to 
promote employment and work placement. Consequently, active labour market 
policies are geared towards reducing the unemployment rate. In order to take 
into account various categories of worker, in addition to the overall 
unemployment rate we have considered unemployment rates for another two 
aggregates which are the subject of special attention in national welfare 
policies: the female unemployment rate, to which reference is frequently made 
in the European recommendations,6 and the youth unemployment rate,7 which 
has been especially impacted by the economic crisis that has affected the 
various countries since 2007. 
Income support policies target groups of individuals who within the framework 
of the market economy exhibit a certain degree of vulnerability: the elderly, the 
unemployed and the disabled. For each of these categories of individuals we 
have identified as the benchmark indicator the average amount of available 
                                                                    
5 Net disposable income has been calculated by subtracting from gross taxable income 
(adjusted for any deductions granted) income tax (considering any deductions or tax credits) 
and social contributions and adding any monetary benefits granted to the type of family under 
consideration by the relevant country. For the simulation analysis the OECD’s tax-benefit 
calculator model (available at the following link: 
http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/benefitsandwagestax-benefitcalculator.htm) has been used. 
 
6 See note 5. 
7 Based on the number of people aged 15-24 out of work in relation to the youth workforce 
(people in or seeking employment in the 15-24 age group). 
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resources (therefore net of fiscal measures) which the various national welfare 
systems guarantee them. For the elderly we have used the net replacement rate 
relating to compulsory pension schemes that represents the percentage of 
individual income, net of contributions and taxes, which the pension system 
guarantees the single individual after he/she exits the job market. Formally, this 
is represented by the ratio of the net pension to income from employment net 
of tax. Three levels of income from employment were considered: 50%, 100% 
and 150% of national average income from employment. 
Following the same logic, a simulation analysis was used8 to calculate the net 
replacement rate of unemployment benefits during the first year of 
unemployment that represents the proportion of net income from employment 
“replaced” by net benefits received in the event of unemployment. The latter, in 
turn, depend on both income from employment and the recipient’s family 
situation. Therefore, two income categories were considered (67% and 100% 
of national average income from employment) and, within each of them, six 
types of family:9 three “typical” families (single parent, single-earner 
households and families with both partners in employment) without children 
and three families of the same types with two underage children. 
For the disabled we calculated the monetary benefit that, on average, national 
governments allocate to disabled individuals in the form of disability pensions 
or monetary transfers in order to pay medical expenses relating to their 
disability or to pay for care and assistance. 
Finally, in the area of redistribution policies, reference was made to the Gini 
index, calculated based on after-tax disposable income and transfers, and the 
poverty index that in our case indicated the percentage of households with 
disposable incomes10 at least 60% lower than the median national income. 
                                                                    
8 See note 4. 
9 The figures are reported in the Appendix. 
10 The concept to which the OECD “Income distribution and poverty” database refers is 
“equivalised disposable household income”, that is, net household income (net of taxes and 
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4. The performance index 
The next step in the analysis consisted in calculating a synthetic performance 
index recorded by the countries in each sector of social expenditure by 
normalising the values of each outcome within the group of the 19 countries 
concerned. 
Our performance index11 for the ith country and jth sector of social expenditure 
at time t is thus given by: 
                                                            10
minmax
min
,, 



xx
xx
=P itji                                    
  i=1, 2...19     j= 1, 2,.....8 
where xi is the value of the benchmark indicator for expenditure sector j 
assumed by country i, while xmin and xmax represent, respectively, the minimum 
and maximum values for the same indicator within the group of the 19 
countries concerned. 
The performance index in question is “relative”, ranging between 0 and 1, and 
enables a comparison within the group of the countries under consideration. 
Pi,j=0 is indicative of the case in which the i
th country exhibits the worst 
performance of the jth sector of social policies; conversely, Pi,j=1 represents the 
best outcome in terms of the indicator associated with the jth sector of 
expenditure. 
In order to ensure that the highest values of the indicator are representative of 
the best performances, it was necessary to transform a number of variables 
such as: unemployment rate (in the three types considered), the poverty index 
and the Gini index of income concentration. In this case, it is in fact clear that 
higher values of the index would indicate a high gap in the unemployment rate, 
the poverty index and income concentration index compared with the 
                                                                                                                                
inclusive of transfers received) adjusted according to household composition according to 
equivalence scales. 
11 With reference to 2011. 
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respective minimum values, indicating worse – and not better – performance 
for the country concerned. 
We therefore considered the complement to one of the preceding three outcome 
variables interpretable as employment rate, a “welfare” index representative of 
the percentage of households with disposable income of over 60% of the 
median disposable income and an index of equidistribution of disposable 
income. 
For the sectors of social expenditure associated with several benchmark 
indicators (for example family, the elderly, unemployment, labour market and 
redistribution), their average was considered by following the methodology 
used in calculating the Human Development Indices.12 Finally, the aggregate 
indicator for the whole area of the social sector was obtained by adding 
together the individual partial indicators in accordance with the existing 
literature (Tanzi et al. 2000, 2006). For country i at time t we thus have: 



8
1
,,,
j
tjiti PP  
The following table shows the results of the indicator for the individual sectors 
of social policies considered and, in the final column, the aggregate value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                    
12 See the methodological notes available at the following link. 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/calculating-indices 
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Table 1 Social policy performance indicators (2011) 
Countries Family Health Old Age Disability Unemployment Poverty Labour Market Redistribution Final Index 
                    
Austria 0,62126 0,76923 0,69613 0,27054 0,57708 0,58520 0,96474 0,66075 5,14493 
Belgium 0,54025 0,70769 0,25276 0,22685 0,62500 0,05815 0,75571 0,84799 4,01441 
Czech Republic 0,04080 0,29231 0,40562 0,01794 0,67500 0,89162 0,76149 0,93159 4,01637 
Denmark 0,74328 0,58462 0,86510 0,57980 0,35000 0,75367 0,80626 0,96719 5,64992 
Finland 0,64226 0,69231 0,40055 0,44982 0,57500 0,63015 0,74595 0,83303 4,96906 
France 0,53762 0,93846 0,31446 0,17976 0,60000 0,64553 0,65004 0,37331 4,23919 
Germany 0,54099 0,72308 0,23849 0,26485 0,00000 0,60777 0,93137 0,54114 3,84768 
Greece 0,22281 0,72308 0,99908 0,00000 0,50000 0,00000 0,07527 0,09506 2,61530 
Iceland 0,70495 0,96923 1,00000 0,47771 0,37500 1,00000 0,82588 0,98924 6,34201 
Ireland 0,32647 0,72308 0,00000 0,05873 1,00000 0,48720 0,45781 0,44988 3,50317 
Italy 0,17596 0,95385 0,46455 0,08643 0,45000 0,19092 0,56832 0,24245 3,13247 
Luxembourg 0,71300 0,76923 0,79834 0,79098 0,67500 0,55655 0,82431 0,72141 5,84884 
Netherlands 0,73258 0,80000 0,85681 0,30320 0,00000 0,75450 0,97680 0,64757 5,07146 
Norway 0,75070 0,81538 0,31215 1,00000 0,17500 0,74372 1,00000 1,00000 5,79696 
Portugal 0,39984 0,69231 0,45350 0,06413 0,55000 0,33885 0,44803 0,03200 2,97866 
Slovak Republic 0,02455 0,00000 0,48297 0,01405 0,87500 0,60981 0,38541 0,87468 3,26647 
Spain 0,26545 1,00000 0,63536 0,08215 0,37500 0,03751 0,00000 0,00490 2,40037 
Sweden 0,69777 0,89231 0,36188 0,58968 0,80000 0,40445 0,68475 0,74863 5,17946 
United kingdom 0,49666 0,75385 0,05341 0,14525 0,22500 0,44252 0,72489 0,00000 2,84157 
 
The final values are characterised by a high degree of heterogeneity within the 
group of countries considered, ranging from 2.4 (Spain) to 6.3 (Iceland). 
Higher indicators (values > 5) are associated with the Nordic countries (the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg and Iceland) and 
Austria; Ireland, Germany, Belgium, The Czech Republic, France and Finland 
fall within an intermediate range (between 3.5 and 5) while the indicator for the 
Mediterranean countries (Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal) together with 
Slovakia and the UK is lower (with values lower than 3.5). 
The disaggregated analysis of the index (Fig. 2) shows diversity in the 
composition of the index. Performance levels of the “household”, “health”, 
“employment market” and “redistribution” sectors are higher in the Nordic 
systems (Finland, Sweden, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark 
and Norway) and in some of the countries with a continental welfare model 
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(Germany and Austria) which achieve an indicator of over 0.5. In the 
Mediterranean countries, in contrast, the better-performing components are 
represented by “health” and “the elderly”, while markedly poor performances 
are highlighted by context indicators relating to the fight against poverty and 
redistribution policies. 
 
Fig. 2 Composition of the performance index by sector 
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5. Variability in the performance of the social sector 
As can be seen from Table 1, the performance index of the social sector is 
characterised by a certain degree of variability in the context of the European 
countries considered, as is its composition (Fig. 2). 
What might account for such variability in performance? Are higher levels of 
performance necessarily associated with higher levels of expenditure? Or does 
an increase in the level of performance instead require a rationalisation of 
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spending policies with an internal reallocation of resources (for example 
between the various types of measure)? 
At first sight, the level of expenditure would appear to be the explanatory 
variable. High values of the performance index (≥ 5) are seen in the Nordic 
countries, which typically have generous social policies, while markedly lower 
values (≤ 3) are associated with the Mediterranean countries, which are 
traditionally characterised by a lower level social expenditure. The correlations 
between total gross social expenditure13 and the performance index in fact is 
positive, and linear interpolation accounts for around 18% of the phenomenon 
(Fig. 3). 
Fig. 3 Gross Social Expenditure/GDP and Performance index (2011) 
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Source: analysis of OECD data 
                                                                    
13 The figure therefore also includes private measures implemented in the social sector, which 
however have a minimal impact on national social policies (see note 14). 
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In recent years, however, several socio-economic factors have had an impact 
on national social policies, modifying the level of expenditure in a non-uniform 
way. Between 2000 and 2011 public social expenditure increased by 7% in 
relation to GDP in the Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland and Norway) and by 
29% in the Mediterranean countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain), thus 
reducing discrepancies, which nonetheless persisted. 
This phenomenon is even more evident if we consider net public social 
expenditure, that is, social spending not only net of measures undertaken by the 
private sector14 but also of fiscal measures (in three forms: direct taxation of 
income resulting from social transfers, indirect taxation on consumption by 
recipients of transfers, and tax benefits for social welfare purposes) which the 
State imposes on it. 
Following Adema et al. (1996, 1999, 2014) and in contrast to the prevailing 
literature, we therefore consider net (and not gross) public expenditure which 
represents the net – albeit aggregate – benefit that national social policies 
provide for beneficiaries. In this sense, it represents a more appropriate 
indicator of the intensity of public intervention in the social sector. 
In the Nordic countries (Finland, Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway and 
Sweden), fiscal measures (taxation net of tax benefits granted) reduce gross 
social expenditure by around 20%. More limited measures characterise the 
other countries. 
The result is reduced variability in net levels of expenditure (from 18.2 for total 
gross expenditure to 9.3 for net public expenditure) and a reranking of the 
countries,15 mainly placing all of the countries in the Nordic system (with the 
exception of Norway) and a number in the continental system (Austria and 
                                                                    
14 Private expenditure in the social sector is limited, albeit higher in the Nordic countries. 
Indeed, in 2011 it accounted for around 5% of total social expenditure in Iceland, the UK and 
Denmark. The highest value is observed in the Netherlands where private expenditure in 2011 
was 6.8% of total social expenditure. In the other countries it ranged from a minimum of 0.2% 
to a maximum of around 3% of total social expenditure. 
15 The Appendix provides data on public and net social expenditure and the associated country 
rankings. 
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Luxembourg) in lower positions. By comparing the performance indicator with 
net social expenditure in relation to GDP (Fig. 4), a high level of variability of 
the index emerges corresponding to given levels of expenditure, as does the 
absence of a clear general trend, while clearer correlations can be observed 
within the subgroups of countries. 
 
Figure 4.  The performance index and net public social expenditure/GDP 
(2011) 
 
 
Consideration of net expenditure does not enable the traditional four-way 
distinction of national welfare systems to be made on the basis of social 
expenditure. Fig. 4 shows that most of the countries considered – belonging to 
different welfare models – rank between the first and the third quartile of net 
public social expenditure (with values, respectively, of 23.5 and 19.7) and with 
an extremely high degree of heterogeneity in terms of their respective 
performance index. 
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Conversely, we may investigate the relationship that exists between the two 
variables considered (performance index and net public social 
expenditure/GDP) by classifying the countries into subgroups distinguished by 
difference levels of performance. What emerges is that for countries lying at 
the extremes of the distribution according to performance index,16 there is not a 
strong positive correlation with expenditure. Therefore, the performance level 
of the social system appears to be unrelated to the national level of expenditure. 
In this regard, possible differences in performance levels and the resulting 
possible policy measures may regard qualitative differences (such as the 
composition of social expenditure in terms of purpose, the mechanism for 
financing said expenditure of the main type of measures – monetary or in-kind 
– that may have an impact on the outcomes of social policies) as opposed to 
quantitative differences in social policies. 
A difference situation emerges when considering those countries which place 
between the first and second quartile of the index (with corresponding values 
of 3.2 and 4.01) for which a positive correlation exists (with a correlation 
coefficient of 0.63) between expenditure level and the performance of the 
social system (Fig. 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                    
16 The reference is to countries belonging to the first quartile and to the interquartile difference 
Q4-Q3 of the performance index distribution (the benchmark value for the first quartile is 3.2, 
while the third quartile is given by 5.16). The countries in question are the Nordic countries 
and the Mediterranean countries. 
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  Fig. 5 Performance and Net Public Social Expenditure: subgroup 1 (2011) 
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   Source: analysis of OECD and Eurostat data 
 
The correlation remains positive but is less marked (with a correlation 
coefficient of 0.28) if we gradually expand the set of countries, extending the 
analysis to performance index values falling within the third and first quartile 
of the distribution (Fig. 6). 
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  Fig. 6 Performance and Net Public Social Expenditure: subgroup 2 (2011) 
 
      Source: analysis of OECD and Eurostat data 
 
In contrast, the correlation between expenditure and performance for some 
continental countries (France, Belgium, and Germany) is markedly clearer, 
with the addition of Ireland and Slovakia (Fig. 7). 
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Fig. 7 Performance and Net Public Social Expenditure: subgroup 3 (2011) 
 
  Source: analysis of OECD and Eurostat data 
 
The analysis illustrated above does not evidence a clear relationship between 
performance of the social sector and (net) resources invested in social policies. 
This is more evident in countries with a high or low performance index, while 
countries that rank in intermediate positions in terms of the outcomes of social 
policies (primarily France, Belgium, and Germany, to which Ireland is added) 
show a positive correlation between net expenditure and performance. 
In general, the level of net expenditure does not seem to be the main 
explanatory variable for the different results that characterise the social sector 
of the various countries. Despite essentially similar levels of net expenditure, a 
high degree of variability in terms of performance is observed, such as in the 
cases of Italy, Germany and Denmark, for example. This variability in 
performance thus does not appear to be attributable to private expenditure in 
the social sector (which is not included in the net social expenditure figure) 
which is in any case limited in comparison with public policies in all of the 
countries. 
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In Denmark, it accounts for around 5% of total social expenditure, while in 
Italy and Germany private involvement in the social sector is much lower 
(respectively 0.8% and 2% of total social expenditure). For this group of 
countries, it may thus be deduced that Denmark’s better performance Denmark 
can be accounted for, at least in part, by the greater involvement of the private 
sector. Nevertheless, the role of private social expenditure does not seem to 
represent the key element in evaluating variability in the countries’ 
performance. Private-sector participation in welfare in the UK is the same as in 
Denmark (around 5%), yet its outcome indicators are overall markedly lower 
than those of Ireland and Slovakia, where net expenditure levels are lower and 
primarily public in nature. 
It is therefore necessary to perform a direct qualitative analysis aimed at 
identifying the qualitative factors (type of measure, intervention sectors, etc.) 
which have the greatest impact on the results in order to identify the variables 
that can best be the subject of policies of rationalisation of social expenditure. 
 
6. How many welfare systems in Europe? A cluster analysis 
In addition to the quantity of resources allocated to public expenditure, another 
variable identified in the literature to characterise welfare systems is the 
composition of expenditure. This refers to the relative importance attributed to 
the three main aims of welfare systems: increasing remuneration for 
participation in the labour market, combating social exclusion and reducing 
inequality. The first objective is typically pursued by means of measures 
designed to protect workers from the risks associated with the labour market 
and their own life cycle, such as unemployment benefits and pensions, in-kind 
transfers linked to previous employment, as well as active labour market 
policies. The second objective is pursued by means of social security transfers 
designed to provide for those in need. The third objective is pursued through 
universal transfers.  
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In practice, it is difficult to assign each item of expenditure to one single 
objective, as instruments may target more than one of them at the same time. 
Based on the main objective, we have divided social expenditure into the three 
types for the European countries under consideration (see Table A4 in the 
Appendix). 
The data indicate that the main objective is connected with labour market 
participation in Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Redistribution prevails in Denmark, 
Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden (countries traditionally 
characterised by a low level of income concentration), while in Iceland, Ireland 
and the UK social assistance is relatively more important, exceeding 10% of 
overall expenditure. 
Thus, countries exhibiting a higher performance index are those in which the 
third objective is predominant. 
Another perspective from which the composition of expenditure can be 
assessed is the difference between monetary transfers and direct provision of 
social services, an element that differentiates the welfare systems identified in 
the literature. On average, the ratio of cash transfers17 to benefits in kind in 
OECD countries is 70%. This ratio is below 60% in Sweden (0.35), the UK 
(0.45), Iceland (0.51), Norway (0.54), Germany (0.56) and Denmark (0.58). 
Does a correlation exist between these indicators and the performance index? 
In order to answer this question, we conducted a cluster analysis for the year 
2011 (Greece and Luxembourg were not included because of lack of data). As 
indicators of the composition of social public expenditure, we used the shares 
of expenditure connected with the labour market, with social assistance and 
with redistribution in total gross public social expenditure and the ratio of 
monetary benefits to benefits in kind. Variables were scaled by their standard 
                                                                    
17 Considered net of pensions, since these reflect contributions paid and the demographic 
structure of the population. 
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deviation; we used the Euclidean measurement of distance and the average link 
aggregation method. 
The results show that countries are divided into five groups: the first one 
comprises the UK on its own; the second Denmark, Sweden, Norway, the 
Netherlands, Iceland and Ireland; the third the Czech Republic and Slovakia; 
the fourth Austria, Germany, Belgium, Finland and France; and the fifth Italy, 
Spain and Portugal. The groups do not change if the share of public social 
expenditure in GDP is included. 
With the exception of Austria and Ireland (the latter being in any case an 
outlier on the “edge” of the group of central European countries), the results 
confirm the association between the type of welfare system, according to the 
traditional classification, and the level of performance illustrated in the 
previous section. The Nordic countries are characterised by a high level of the 
index, the central European countries by an intermediate level, and the 
southern European countries and the UK by a low level. 
The results also indicate the existence of a positive link between performance, 
level and composition of social expenditure: countries characterised by high 
shares of public expenditure mainly geared towards redistribution perform 
better in the social sector. 
This seems to confirm that European countries belong to the traditional types 
of welfare systems, apart from Ireland shifting away from the Anglo-Saxon 
group towards the continental countries. 
This conclusion, however, is dependent on the choice of indicators used for the 
cluster analysis, and the same is true in general for the results obtained in the 
literature: the diversity of the results often stems from different choices with 
respect to the characteristics of the welfare systems deemed significant. 
For example, Bertola et al. (2001) confirm the existence of the Anglo-Saxon 
group and of a group consisting of Spain and Portugal, while the Nordic 
28 
 
E-PFRP N. 18 
2016 
 
countries, especially Sweden and Finland, and the continental countries are 
very close to one another. Considering specifically the level of social 
expenditure and its composition, Bertola et al. (2001) identify the following 
groups for the year 1990: Denmark and the Netherlands; Spain and Portugal; 
Ireland and the UK; Greece and Italy; Germany, Austria, France, Finland and 
Belgium. In 1996, the groups had become Denmark, Spain and Portugal; 
Ireland and the UK; Germany, Austria, Greece and Italy; France, Finland, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Belgium. Their results also show a decrease in the 
distance between the Nordic countries and the continental countries. 
The distinction between the continental and the southern group is actually an 
issue debated in the literature. Minas et al. (2014) agree on the existence of the 
fourth southern model; applying cluster analysis to the aspects of 
familiarisation, the predominance of State or market, religion and favouritism, 
they distinguish a group of countries formed by southern European countries 
and – moving beyond the geographical connotation – by Ireland. Joumard et al. 
(2012), instead, using indicators relating to the size, mix and progressivity of 
taxes and transfers, do not find a distinct group for these countries. 
In fact, a convergence of European welfare systems could be a result of the 
process of economic integration. Indeed, this may have influenced welfare 
systems via various channels. First, by increasing growth in the poorer 
countries, it may entail both a greater need and a greater capacity to fund 
systems of social protection. Secondly, the fiscal criteria of the Maastricht 
Treaty may have exerted a pressure to rein in social expenditure for all 
countries. Finally, the greater mobility of labour may have enabled a greater 
degree of insurance against market dynamics, but may also have led to tax 
competition between countries (Sandmo, 2001; Sinn, 2002). 
With regard to the first two points, Caminada et al. (2010) note that economic 
integration has favoured growth in relatively poorer countries and that between 
1995 and 2003 gross public social expenditure rose, with a convergence among 
countries. This seems to contradict the existence of negative effects of the 
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Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact on the social protection 
effort, as noted in Bertola et al. (2001). Nevertheless, the latter paper pointed to 
changes in the implementation of welfare programmes: 1) the tightening of 
eligibility criteria, in particular by stepping up means testing; 2) better 
coordination of services and greater decentralisation; 3) a trend towards greater 
recourse to private social expenditure. In addition, if we consider net public 
social expenditure, we find – as Caminada et al. (2010) note – that it has 
decreased, with a diverging trend among countries. 
With reference to the third point, the literature does not find evidence of tax 
competition (Caminada et al., 2010). This might be due to the convergence 
stimulus provided by the objectives of the EES (European Employment 
Strategy) and the Lisbon Strategy. For example, for active labour market 
policies, Van Vliet (2010) notes that expenditure has increased, although 
differences persist between countries in the configuration of the instruments 
adopted. 
Thus, our analysis accounts for the variability of performance by using 
indicators (such as the gross public social expenditure/GDP ratio, the 
composition by target, and the share of benefits in kind in total expenditure) 
that are characteristics for which welfare systems have not shifted away from 
their traditional configuration. 
In what follows, we try to represent the structure of welfare systems more 
completely, that is, using a broader set of indicators, including variables both 
on the expenditure side and on the financing side. In particular, we consider the 
composition of gross public social expenditure (share of each sub-sector; ratio 
of monetary benefits to benefits in kind; shares of expenditure connected with 
the labour market, with assistance and with redistribution in total gross public 
social expenditure); size of the welfare system (measured, alternatively, as 
gross public social expenditure, net public social expenditure, total gross social 
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expenditure18 and total net social expenditure, as a share of GDP); financing 
methods (revenue levels of taxes on social transfers as a share of GDP and 
share of direct and indirect taxes within them; ratio of total tax revenues to 
GDP and shares of personal taxes including social contributions, taxes on 
goods and services and property taxes); Gini index after tax and transfers (the 
source of the data is the OECD Statistical Database). With reference to the 
same 17 European countries examined previously, we conducted a cluster 
analysis for the year 2011. Variables were scaled by their standard deviation; 
the Euclidean measurement of distance was used, while the aggregation 
method used was the average link method. The main results can be summarised 
as follows: 
a) Composition 
The first cluster analysis regards the composition of public expenditure. By 
initially considering only the shares of total public social expenditure 
represented by the sub-sectors, three groups are identified: a Nordic group, 
consisting of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, towards which also the 
Netherlands gravitates; a second, “continental” group, including also the 
southern countries, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Ireland, the latter being 
relatively close to Spain and Belgium, just as Austria, Portugal and Italy are 
very close to each other: note that this configuration excludes – at least with 
regard to composition by sub-sectors -  the existence of a cluster of southern 
countries. The third group is formed by the UK and Iceland. 
Adding the ratio of monetary benefits to benefits in kind does not change the 
groups. 
With the addition of the division of expenditure by purpose (labour market, 
social assistance and universal measures), the groups change: the Nordic group 
                                                                    
18 Total social expenditure includes private social expenditure: private programmes may in fact 
substitute public programmes in the pursuit of the same objectives (Adema et al., 1996; 2011), 
although with a lower redistributive impact (Begg and Bergman, 2002; Antonelli and De 
Bonis, 2015). 
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now also includes Ireland. It may be noted that, when considering only the 
three-way division, the Netherlands is much more similar to the Nordic 
countries. In addition, when considering only the three-way division, Finland 
would join the continental group, and Iceland the Nordic group, forming a 
subgroup with Norway, the Netherlands and Ireland, while Denmark and 
Sweden would constitute the other subgroup. 
b) Composition and levels 
Adding gross public social expenditure (as a share of GDP) confirms the 
existence of a Nordic group with the Netherlands, a central group, which is 
joined by Ireland on the one side and the Czech Republic and Slovakia on the 
other, and a third group, comprising the UK and Iceland, while, when 
considering net public social expenditure, Ireland returns to the Nordic group. 
The same result is obtained by using total gross or net social expenditure in 
place of net public social expenditure. 
c) Composition, levels, Gini index (after taxes and transfers) 
Adding the Gini index does not change the result if net public social 
expenditure or total public social expenditure is used. Yet, if gross public social 
expenditure is used, the addition of the index results in the decomposition of 
the central group into five subgroups: Ireland; Spain and Belgium; Italy and 
Portugal; the Czech Republic and Slovakia; and Germany, France and Austria. 
To evaluate the role of the individual variables in determining the clusters, it 
may be noted that: 
 Considering only the sub-sectors and gross public social expenditure, 
Ireland joins the Nordic group, while it is in the continental group if net 
public social expenditure is considered; the continental group sees 
Germany and France closer to Austria, Portugal and Italy than to Spain 
and Belgium and to the Czech Republic and Slovakia. If the ratio 
between monetary transfers and benefits in kind is added, Ireland joins 
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the group of continental countries, where Spain and Belgium are less 
central than the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
 Adding the Gini index results in Austria, France and Germany moving 
closer to each other within the central group (including Ireland), if gross 
public social expenditure is considered. 
 Considering the sub-sectors, the three-way division according to 
purpose, the ratio of monetary benefits to benefits in kind and the 
performance index (therefore excluding social expenditure levels), three 
subgroups are obtained within the central group: Ireland, Spain, 
Belgium; Portugal and Italy; Austria, France, Germany, Slovakia and 
the Czech Republic. Without sub-sectors, Iceland joins the Nordic 
countries, while Finland lines up with the central countries. 
d) Financing 
Another aspect that characterises welfare systems are the financing 
instruments, both in terms of the dimensions of total revenue and its 
composition. Alesina et al. (2001) contrast the US and European welfare 
systems, particularly with regard to the greater effectiveness of the latter in 
terms of redistribution, connected with greater revenues from social 
contributions and VAT and more progressive personal income taxation, 
enabling greater financial coverage for income support policies and labour 
market measures.  
Bertola et al. (2001), particularly with regard to European countries, identify in 
general taxation and social contributions the main sources of financing of 
social protection, the latter being more important in the continental and 
southern systems than in the Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries (to which 
Iceland and Portugal can be added, based on 2011 data). With reference to 
2011, the total revenues/GDP ratio was 24% in the USA, a lower level than in 
European countries, which nevertheless record significant differences, ranging 
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from 26.7% in Ireland (with 33.6% for the UK and 28.3% for Slovakia) to 
46.6% in Denmark (with Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Norway and 
Sweden above 40%). Based on these data, Antonelli and De Bonis (2015) find 
a positive correlation between levels of gross and net public social expenditure, 
respectively, and total revenues. 
In addition to the level of revenues, European countries differ as for the type of 
taxation. With reference to 2011, the share attributable to direct taxes is larger 
in Iceland, Norway, the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, and Denmark, closer to the 
average ratio in Germany, Austria and Finland and smaller in the remaining 
countries. An analysis of the data reveals a positive correlation between public 
expenditure, especially gross public expenditure on social protection, and the 
share of total revenues accounted for by direct taxes, confirming the 
importance of redistributive taxes already observed in the comparison between 
European countries and the USA (Antonelli and De Bonis, 2015). 
Considering the financing of social expenditure, first separately and then 
together with other variables, different groups emerge from the ones that take 
shape when expenditure-side variables are used. For instance, the UK and 
Ireland belong to the same group only if the tax system is included in the 
analysis, while other authors find that an Anglo-Saxon group also exists if 
exclusively expenditure-related variables are considered (Bertola et al., 2001; 
Corrado et al., 2003). In addition, the Nordic countries and the central countries 
are very close to each other. 
Considering only taxes on social transfers, in particular the ratio of total 
revenue to GDP and the share of direct taxes and social contributions, the 
groups are very different from the ones that form on the expenditure side. More 
specifically, two groups are obtained, one consisting of the UK, Ireland, Spain 
and Portugal, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and the other of the Nordic 
core countries and the continental countries, in addition to the Netherlands, 
Finland and Iceland. Denmark occupies an intermediate position between the 
two groups. 
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Considering the total revenues to GDP ratio and the shares of personal income 
taxes, taxes on goods and services and taxes on property, two groups are 
obtained, one formed by the UK; Ireland and Iceland, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Portugal; the other one by Sweden, Norway and Denmark; 
France, Italy and Belgium; Spain; the Netherlands, Finland, Germany and 
Austria. Spain thus belongs to the first group, if taxes on social transfers are 
considered, and to the second, if all taxes are considered. 
Considering all variables relating to financing, two groups are obtained: the 
first with a subgroup consisting of the UK, Ireland, Portugal, Iceland and 
another one consisting of the Czech Republic and Slovakia; the second with the 
subgroup Denmark, Sweden and Norway and the subgroup Italy, France, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Finland and Austria; Spain is closer to the 
first group if taxes on social transfers are considered, and to the second when 
considering total taxes. 
e) Expenditure and financing 
Considering together the variables relating to expenditure composition and 
levels, i.e. composition by sub-sectors, monetary and in-kind transfers, purpose 
of expenditure, levels (gross public social expenditure/net public social 
expenditure/total social expenditure, total net social expenditure), the after-tax-
and-transfers Gini index, revenues from taxes on social transfers (ratio to GDP) 
and shares of direct and indirect taxation, total revenue to GDP ratio and shares 
of personal taxes including social contributions, taxes on goods and services 
and property taxes, three clusters are obtained. The first is formed by the UK 
and Iceland; the second by the subgroup of the Nordic countries and the 
Netherlands; the third by Ireland, the subgroup of Portugal, the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia and by the subgroup of Spain, France, Belgium, Germany, Italy 
and Austria. It may be observed that, when only general taxes are considered, 
Ireland does not belong to the continental group, while Portugal belongs to the 
central group due to the taxation on social transfers. 
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7. Conclusions 
In general, the level of net expenditure does not appear to be the exclusive 
explanatory variable for the different results that characterise the social sector 
in the different countries considered. Essentially similar levels of net 
expenditure are often accompanied by a high degree of variability in 
performance, such as for Italy, Germany and Denmark. Furthermore, this 
variability of performance does not appear to be attributable to private 
participation in the social sector (which is not included in the figure for net 
social expenditure) which is in any case limited compared with public policies 
in all countries. 
The performance of European countries seems to be connected to the scale and 
kind of public measures: countries with a higher public social expenditure/GDP 
ratio achieve a higher performance index if transfers are redistributive in 
nature. These characteristics, and thus also the performance level, are in line 
with the traditional classification of European welfare systems, the validity of 
which is confirmed from this perspective. If we consider a more complete set 
of indicators of the structure of welfare systems, irrespective of performance-
related considerations, the traditional classification is no longer up to date. 
Indeed, with regard to the traditional four-way grouping of European welfare 
systems into Nordic, continental, Anglo-Saxon and Mediterranean systems, 
cluster analysis shows that, if only the expenditure side is considered, then 
neither a Mediterranean group as distinct from the continental group, nor an 
Anglo-Saxon group exists (or rather, the latter consists of the UK alone). With 
regard to the financing side, an Anglo-Saxon group exists, formed by the UK 
and Ireland, as does one that includes the Nordic countries as well as the 
continental countries. Considering expenditure-side indicators and financing-
side indicators together three groups form: one comprising the UK and Iceland, 
one the Nordic countries and the Netherlands, one continental (and southern) 
countries and Ireland. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1. Social expenditure sectors in the OECD database 
Sectors Cash benefits  Benefits in kind 
Old age Pensions 
Residential care; home 
help services 
Incapacity related* Disability pensions 
Residential care; home 
help services; 
rehabilitation services. 
Health   
Health care services, 
Prevention services, Drugs 
Family 
 Family allowances, 
Maternity and Parental 
Leave, Transfers to lone 
parent families 
ECEC, Home help 
Labour Market Start-up incentives 
PES; Training for target 
groups 
Unemployment 
Unemployment 
compensation; severance 
pay; early retirement 
  
Other social policy areas 
(income maintenance and 
social assistance) 
Income maintenance Social assistance 
*Eurostat data for incapacity related cash benefits. 
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Table A2. Net replacement rates: case 1 (67% AW) (2011) 
  67% of AW 
  No children 2 children 
  
Single 
person  
One-
earner 
married 
couple 
Two-
earner 
married 
couple 
Lone 
parent 
One-
earner 
married 
couple 
Two-
earner 
married 
couple 
Austria 55 57 79 71 73 85 
Belgium 85 73 84 85 74 86 
Czech 
Republic 
65 65 88 67 67 88 
Denmark 83 84 91 88 86 92 
Finland 57 57 78 73 67 83 
France 69 65 84 71 68 84 
Germany 59 59 87 81 83 90 
Greece 46 46 71 51 51 74 
Iceland 76 77 88 82 80 90 
Ireland 50 81 75 64 75 81 
Italy 68 72 84 76 73 87 
Luxemb
ourg 
83 82 90 89 89 93 
Netherla
nds 
76 77 84 67 81 78 
Norway 67 69 84 79 74 86 
Portugal 75 75 92 77 76 91 
Slovak 
Republic 
62 58 85 72 57 86 
Spain 79 76 89 77 76 89 
Sweden 66 66 83 74 70 84 
UK 20 31 60 48 57 69 
Source: OECD  Benefits and wages statistics  http://www.oecd.org/els/benefits-and-wages-
statistics.htm 
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Table A3. Net replacement rate: case 2 (100% AW) (2011) 
  100% of AW 
  No children 2 children 
  
Single person  
One-earner 
married 
couple 
Single person  
One-earner 
married 
couple 
Single person  
One-earner 
married 
couple 
Austria 55 56 76 68 69 81 
Belgium 63 55 72 67 59 74 
Czech 
Republic 
65 65 84 70 67 88 
Denmark 57 60 74 67 64 76 
Finland 53 53 73 66 61 77 
France 66 67 80 71 68 81 
Germany 59 59 83 72 70 88 
Greece 32 33 59 37 37 62 
Iceland 61 66 77 69 71 80 
Ireland 36 58 63 63 67 69 
Italy 55 59 74 68 68 76 
Luxembourg 85 83 89 92 89 92 
Netherlands 75 77 83 68 80 78 
Norway 65 66 79 77 69 81 
Portugal 75 75 91 77 76 95 
Slovak 
Republic 
65 59 82 93 58 84 
Spain 58 58 75 73 73 83 
Sweden 46 46 68 55 51 70 
United 
Kingdom 
14 22 49 41 48 57 
 
Source: OECD Benefits and wages statistics  http://www.oecd.org/els/benefits-and-wages-
statistics.htm 
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Table A4. Social expenditure by objective (anno 2011) 
%GDP Labour market Inequality Social exclusion 
Austria 14,7 11,7 1,1 
 
Belgium 15,4 12,8 1,1 
 Czech 
Republic 10,9 8,7 0,6 
 
Denmark 12,1 16,3 1,7 
 
Finland 14,5 12,5 1,4 
 
France 16,9 12,7 1,7 
 
Germany 13,2 11,5 0,9 
 
Iceland 4,2 11,8 2,3 
 
Ireland 10,1 10 2,3 
 
Italy 16,8 9,9 0,8 
 
Netherlands 8,9 12,8 1,7 
 
Norway 8,1 12,7 1 
 
Portugal 15,2 8,9 0,6 
 Slovak 
Republic 8,9 8,7 0,6 
 
Spain 15,5 10,1 0,9 
 
Sweden 10,4 15,6 1,2 
 United 
Kingdom 6,1 12,8 4 
 %Gross Social 
Public 
Expenditure Labour market Inequality Social exclusion 
Austria 0,528777 0,420863 0,039568 
 
Belgium 0,52381 0,435374 0,037415 
 Czech 
Republic 0,542289 0,432836 0,029851 
 
Denmark 0,404682 0,545151 0,056856 
 
Finland 0,510563 0,440141 0,049296 
 
France 0,539936 0,405751 0,054313 
 
Germany 0,515625 0,449219 0,035156 
 
Iceland 0,230769 0,648352 0,126374 
 
Ireland 0,450893 0,446429 0,102679 
 
Italy 0,610909 0,36 0,029091 
 
Netherlands 0,378723 0,544681 0,07234 
 
Norway 0,369863 0,579909 0,045662 
 
Portugal 0,615385 0,360324 0,024291 
 Slovak 
Republic 0,489011 0,478022 0,032967 
 
Spain 0,578358 0,376866 0,033582 
 
Sweden 0,383764 0,575646 0,04428 
 United 
Kingdom 0,266376 0,558952 0,174672 
 
Source: Analysis of OECD data. 
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